International Negotiation
A Journal of Theory and Practice
| This issue | Guest
editors |
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| Innovation in International Negotiation: Content and Style | Jan Ulijn, Eindhoven University of Technology Dean Tjosvold, Lingnan University |
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Abstracts Vol. 9, no. 2 2004
| The Effect of Dutch and German Culture on Negotiation Strategy: An Exploratory Study to Compare Innovation and Operations Contexts | |
| JAN M. ULIJN Department of Organization Science, Eindhoven University of Technology, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands (J.M.Ulijn@tm.tue.nl) ANDREAS LINCKE Faculty of Economics, Darmstadt University of Technology, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany (alincke@gmx.de) and FINN WYNSTRA Erasmus Research Institute of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands ( fwynstra@fbk.eur.nl) |
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Different business settings may induce different types of negotiation behavior. More specifically, clearly defined problems in an operations management (OM) setting may lead to different negotiation behavior than more diffuse innovation management (IM) problems. In addition, negotiators from different national cultures may react differently to such variations in business settings. This article addresses these issues through a set of experiments. The specific goal of our study is to understand whether there is a difference between German and Dutch negotiators regarding their negotiation behavior in IM and OM settings. To analyze possible cross-cultural differences, negotiations that took place in a German monocultural setting and those which occurred in a Dutch monocultural setting are compared. Two hypotheses were tested: |
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| Establishing Trust via Technology: Long Distance Practices and Pitfalls | |
GAYLEN D. PAULSON |
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| Global negotiators often depend upon communication technologies to convey information and strike deals. Unfortunately, negotiations conducted via more “lean” media (e.g., e-mail, telephone) have been associated with low levels of trust and difficulties in reaching agreements. We explore two approaches to building trust while communicating via the internet. Derived from the literature on interpersonal trust, negotiators were asked to adopt one of two strategies. The first was to build personal rapport. The second was to discuss ground rules and procedures for the negotiation. Negotiators who spent time building rapport reported greater levels of trust, and were more confident and satisfied with their outcomes. These perceptions were evident even though outcomes were comparable across conditions. The most negatively perceived negotiations were those that included rules discussions without the benefit of rapport. Implications of these findings for theory and practice are discussed | |
| A Game Theoretical Approach of Price Negotiation and Coordination in an Innovative Firm-Supplier Context: An Experimental Analysis | |
| JEANNE DUVALLET Laboratory G.I.L.C.O (Gestion Industrielle, Logistique et Conception), INPG – ENSGI, 46 Avenue Felix Viallet, 38031 Grenoble Cedex 1, France (jeanne.duvallet@ensgi.inpg.fr) ALEXIS GARAPIN, DANIEL LLERENA Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (G.A.E.L.), INRA, Université Pierre Mendès France, 38040 Grenoble Cedex 9, France B.P. 47 and STEPHANE ROBIN **** Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique (G.A.T.E), CNRS, Université Lyon 2, , 93, chemin des Mouilles - B.P.16, 69131 ECULLY, France (robin@gate.cnrs.fr) |
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| This article analyzes a sequential interaction between a firm and its supplier, involving negotiation in the first round and coordination between two different production activities in the second round. The evolution of the vertical relations in the manufacturing sectors reveals that the performance of the firms increasingly depends on these two dimensions. Price negotiation determines the share of the profits of the two actors, while coordination determines the performance of the overall chain. To model this sequential interaction between the supplier and the firm, we use the tools and concepts of game theory. While game theory usually considers the coordination problem as an isolated phenomenon, the originality of our work is that it examines the problem of in a context where coordination between agents is preceded by a negotiation phase. The model emphasizes the influence of the price negotiation on the coordination round. Several theoretical predictions are proposed, derived not only from the strict assumptions of game theory, but also from assumptions which relax those of game theory. These predictions are then experimentally tested. The results do not confirm the predictions of game theory. In fact, they are consistent with the predictions put forth as alternatives to the predictions of game theory. They show i) a propensity to maximize the performance of the chain, and ii) a propensity to arrive at an equitable share of the joint profit in the chain. Finally, though the experiment was not designed to study cross-cultural or international cases, the results suggest new research directions in this area. | |
| How to Reduce Uncertainty in a Context of Innovation: The Case of IBM’s Negotiation of its European Works Council | |
| ALICE LE FLANCHEC University Paris 1 (Panthéon Sorbonne), Sciences de Gestion (UFR 06), 17, Rue de la Sorbonne 75231 Paris Cedex 05 France (flanchec@hotmail.com) |
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| Uncertainty is one of the natural consequences of innovation. Regardless of the particular area, innovation leads to unknown situations ranging from the creation of high-tech new products to profound modification of economic and social structures.. This uncertainty creates difficulties for negotiation processes because it becomes almost impossible to anticipate all the consequences of any agreement. Consequently, innovation tremendously enhances the uncertainty of a negotiator with regard to his own interests. Uncertainty about the opponent’s interests and behavior is of course another major concern and has been dealt with extensively by many authors. This paper deals with the very different concept of uncertainty regarding one’s own interests. It analyzes the impact of this form of uncertainty in the negotiation process, examining the 1997-1999 negotiations at IBM over the implementation of a European Works Council. We show that when a negotiator is uncertain about his own interests, he is less inclined to consider positions located in his uncertainty zone. This occurs as soon as he discoevers an acceptable outcome outside of this zone, even when the agreement is little differentthan the status quo. The negotiator will persist in such a strategy even though alternative agreements located in the uncertainty zone could be more advantageous for one or even both parties. In order to enlarge the zone of potential agreements between parties, a negotiator should undertake one further step: exploration of his own uncertainty zone. We demonstrate that the adoption of such a strategy, is innovative in and of itself, requiring a pro-active and creative attitude on the part of negotiators in order to discover appropriate uncertainty reduction mechanisms. | |
| Innovating Across Cultural Boundaries: Applying Conflict Theory to Develop a Common Approach | |
| DEAN TJOSVOLD and ALFRED S. H. WONG ** Department of Management, Lingnan University, Hong Kong (tjosvold@ln.edu.hk; wongsh@ln.edu.hk) |
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| Diversity of people and perspectives can contribute to the ability of teams to develop and implement innovation in organizations. However, to do so they must manage their conflicts. Considerable research in the West and recent studies in China have documented the value of a cooperative approach to conflict for teamwork and innovation in collectivist as well as individualist cultures. When team members attempt to resolve their disputes for mutual benefit, they have been found to make high quality decisions to which they are committed. This article proposes that diverse people can use this theory to develop common values, norms, and procedures that are accessible and effective for all cultural groups. | |
| Ethicality in Negotiation: An Analysis of Attitudes, Intentions, and Outcomes | |
ROGER J. VOLKEMA |
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| The study reported in this article examines the prediction and use of invalid information (e.g., exaggerated offers, false promises, misrepresented facts) in a two-party, property leasing negotiation in which participants from different countries negotiated seven issues via electronic mail. Prior to negotiating, attitudes and intentions towards questionable or unethical tactics were measured, and perceived behavior was measured through a post-negotiation questionnaire and compared with actual behavior and negotiated outcomes (differential and joint). The results suggest that the pre-negotiation questionnaire was a modest predictor of actual behavior, with general attitudes effective in predicting general behavior. Ethical behavior of the negotiator, ethical behavior of the other party, and perceived honesty of the other party were the best predictors of performance (perceived and actual), while likely use of unethical tactics and perceived honesty of the other party predicted whether or not an agreement was reached. | |
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